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A CASE STUDY IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY
ECUADOR'S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES STRUGGLE FOR
REDRESS
Maxi Lyons
INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations often wield more power than many of the world's
nations, the immense wealth and political influence of multinationals make them
powerhouses m the global economy These domineering enterprises are often able
to undertake profit-making endeavors, particularly involving the consumption or
extraction of natural resources, in developing nations with little or no regulation
and often without meeting social and cultural responsibilities to the local
communities and environments adhered to in the United States (U.S.). The eastern
half of the Ecuadonan Amazon, known as Oriente, is one of the richest bioregions
on the planet, and a rich source of oil that has been exploited by multinational oil
companies for thirty years.' Oil extraction in the Amazon has led to contamination
of the waters and land, deforestation, and resulted in sickness in indigenous
communities, threatening some communities with cultural extinction. 2 The jungle
of Ecuador will be extinguished in its entirety within forty years at the present rate
of deforestation however, the oil extracted and sold m the global marketplace is the
foundation of Ecuador's economy and is therefore promoted by the Ecuadorian
government as the key to development. 3 Despite initial opposition by the
Ecuadorian government, indigenous peoples of Ecuador formed grassroots
resistance movements
educating and galvanmzmg local communities against
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1. Peter Lippman, Introduction: Environmental Assault and Grassroots Resistance, The
Advocacy Project, Defending the Amazon, at http://www.advocacynet.org/cpage view/
amazonoilintroduction 17 58.html (last visited Mar. 17 2004). See Rights Violations in the
Ecuadorian Amazon: The Human Consequences of Oil Development, The Center for Economic and
Social Rights, Mar. 1994 at x, available at www.cesr.org/publications.htm (last visited April 4, 2004)
[hereinafter CESRI .
2. Lippman, supra note 1.
3. Id.
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exploitation, which led to citizens of Ecuador and Peru filing two putative class
actions against Texaco (now ChevronTexaco4 ) alleging the oil company polluted
ram forests and rivers m those two countries, causing environmental damage and
personal injuries.5 The litigation surrounding the now consolidated cases has been
touted as "the antiglobalization trial of the century ,6 Although environmental
contamination and human rights violations are central to the legal case, the
fundamental issue underlying this landmark case is corporate responsibility, in
particular, the accountability of multinational corporations operating in developing
and underdeveloped countries where regulation is often far more lax than standards
a corporation operating in the U.S. would be held to.
This paper takes the position that multinational corporations have social and
environmental responsibilities to the peoples and environs from which their
enterprises profit that demand legal remedy when breached. As a case study in
multinationals operating without accountability, this paper details the
developments and implications of the case against ChevronTexaco throughout
more than a decade of litigation and discusses generally the barriers to redress
encountered by plaintiffs, such as the Ecuadorian and Peruvian plaintiffs,
attempting to bring suit against multinationals operating in a global market.
Section II discusses the background of ChevronTexaco's operations in Ecuador
and the political and economic environment at the time of operations as well as the
impacts of these operations to the natural and cultural environment in Ecuador and
Peru and the potential liabilities incurred as a result. Section III analyzes the cases
brought against ChevronTexaco for their allegedly sub-standard waste disposal
techniques that resulted in environmental and cultural devastation. Section IV
highlights the associated case now pending in Ecuador, which was brought
following the U.S. federal court's dismissal of the U.S. suit. Section V looks to the
future of Ecuador's oil development as an economic force following the
ChevronTexaco debacle. Section VI outlines the new laws and regulations that will
shape oil extraction in the future by empowering indigenous peoples to have both
information and meaningful participation in the processes. Section VII considers
generally the barriers encountered by plaintiffs attempting to gain access to redress
for wrongs committed by multinationals in foreign jurisdictions, and Section VIII
proposes solutions for improving means of redress as a mechanism for demanding
multinational accountability in an international context. Section IX calls for
universal standards to be established through collaborative efforts of the
international community to demand multinational social, cultural and economic
accountability in the environs within which they operate.

4. In 2001, Texaco became ChevronTexaco following a merger between the two companies. See
infra text accompanying note 68. In this paper, the name Texaco is used for activitlies before 2001 and
ChevronTexaco is used for activities following 2001.
5. See Aguinda v. Texaco (Agumda ), 1994 WL 142006, 6 (SDNY April 11, 1994). See also

Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc., Dkt. No.94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y filed Dec. 28, 1994).
6. Marc Lifsher, Chevron Would Face $5 Billion Tab For Amazon Cleanup, Expert Says, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, available at http://www.texaorainforest.org/wallstreet.htm (last visited April 4,
2004).
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BACKGROUND/HISTORY
The matter of environmental contamination by Texaco, a U.S. domiciled
multinational corporation, m Ecuador was facilitated by a combination of legal,
political and economic factors. In the 1970's and 1980's, "environmental
protection was virtually nonexistent m Ecuador" as "the first environmental impact
assessments were only introduced in Latin America in the 1990's.,, 7 Economics
was a key factor for both the Republic of Ecuador, who leased the land within the
sensitive rainforest region to Texaco for exploitation as a source of wealth for the
state, and Texaco who gamed high profits with no government regulation or
oversight. 8 Government corruption was also a factor in the despoiling of the
Amazon as "most of the time Texaco was in Ecuador, the government was
unrepresentative and corrupt. Local people, whose forest was leveled and whose
water was polluted, were completely unaware of what oil exploration would do to
them." 9 Thus, the issue that arises is what responsibilities do corporations seizing
such prime profit-making opportunities have to the ecosystems, societies, and
economies within which they operate. Corporate accountability, a topic much
debated since the Enron scandal, should extend beyond accountability to board
members and stockholders to "those most directly affected by their operations."10
Thus, underlying the legal technicalities of the ChevronTexaco case is the more
critical issue of multinational corporate accountability for the welfare of whole
societies from whom they profit.
Texaco s Operationsin Ecuador
In 1964, the Ecuadorian government invited Texaco to develop the country's
first oil field in the Oriente and Texaco's Ecuadonan subsidiary, Texaco Petroleum
Company (TexPet), commenced oil exploration." In 1967 Texaco found oil near
the Columbian border, an unspoiled jungle region of Ecuador that was, at the time,
inhabited by indigenous tribes and missionaries. 12 Texaco began drilling in the
Oriente as part of consortium in which Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf) and Texaco
owned equal shares with the Ecuadonan government-owned PetroEcuador
7 The Advocacy Project, From the Editors: CorporateResponsibility on Trial, 16 AMAZON OIL
5, Mar. 11, 2001, at http://www.advocacynet.org/newsview/news_192.html (last visited April 4, 2004)
[hereinafter From the Editors].
8. Judith Kimerling, The Environmental Audit of Texaco's Amazon Oil Fields: Environmental
Justice or Business as Usual? 7 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 199, 201 (1994).
9. From the Editors, supra note 7.
10. Id.
Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aquinda IX), 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002). The first oil field was
located in a 200 square mile region of the Amazon's Oriente region. See Amazon Watch, Ecuador, The
Chevron-Texaco Toxic Legacy: Timeline - The Case Against ChevronTexaco, at
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/toxico/
index.php?pagenumber=5 (last visited Mar. 15, 2004).
12. T. Christian Miller, Ecuador- Texaco Leaves Trailof Destruction:As ChevronTexaco Faces
Major Lawsuit, Evidence Portraysa Company and Nation thatfor Years Showed Little Concernfor
the
Environment,
L.
A.
TIMES,
Nov.
30,
2003,
available
at
http://www.corpwatch.org/news/PNDjsp?articleid=9249 (last visited April 4, 2004).
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acquiring a twenty-five percent share in 1974.13 PetroEcuador became the
majority stakeholder in 1976 when it acquired Gulf s interests. 14 By 1980, in
addition to drilling hundreds of wells, the consortium had constructed the 312-mile
trans-Ecuador pipeline traversing the Andes and built access roads throughout the
jungle.15 TexPet operated the oil pipeline and handled all drilling operations until
PetroEcuador assumed responsibility for the pipeline m 1989 and for drilling
operations in 1990.16
Techniques Employed by Texaco
Between 1971 and 1992 when Texaco ceased operations in Ecuador, Texaco
had drilled 339 wells in over a million acre concession and extracted roughly 1.4
billion barrels of crude oil from the Amazon.17 Texaco's operations generated
more than 3.2 million gallons of waste each day and accidental spills from the
pipeline released an estunated 16.8 million gallons of crude into the Amazon River
- all discharged without prior treatment or followup monitoring. 18 The "drilling
muds" produced during Texaco's oil extraction contain "water, oil, heavy metals
and chemicals used m drilling."' 9 U.S. government studies have shown that
drilling muds such as those dumped in unlined pits near the wells in the Oriente,
can contain "toxic levels of benzene, a known carcinogen, and lead, which can
impede mental development in children." 20 Additionally, Texaco used dirt pits to
separate the oil from water, which produced a waste called "produced water, a
brine that was dumped into nearby streams. 2' According to studies of produced
water in the U.S., it also contains "high levels of benzene and arsemc. 22 These
wastes from Texaco's operations are blamed for the devastation of streams, rivers,
and wetlands in the Amazon basm, impacting both Ecuador's and Peru's
indigenous inhabitants.23
In response to a request from Ecuador's Minster of Energy and Mines for an
environmental audit of the oil fields in 1994, Texaco asserted that during the
company's years of operation they complied with all laws and regulations along
with the company's "operating practices which often go beyond the environmental
laws and regulations of countries around the globe. 24 In sharp contrast to
13. Aguinda X,303 F.3d at 473.
14. Id., See Texaco Inc.'s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Renewed Motions to Dismiss
Based on Forum Non Convemens and International comity at 15.
15. Miller, supra note 12.
16. Aguinda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
17 Kimerling, supra note 8, at 205.
18. Id. The volume of crude spilled from the trans-Ecuador pipeline alone exceeds that of the
Exxon Valdez, the largest oil spill in U.S. history, which dumped approximately 10.8 million gallons of
oil into the Prince William Sound. Id. at n.28.
19. Miller, supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. Id
22. Id.
23. Agumndal, 1994 WL 142006 at 1.
24. Kimerling, supra note 8, at n.5 (citing Letter for J. Michael Trevino, Vice President of Texaco
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Texaco's practices, however, "large [U.S.] operators had mostly abandoned the use
of unlined dirt pits to dispose of drilling muds" by the mid-1980s due to more
stringent disposal regulations for oil waste prompted by growing health and
environmental impact concerns.25 Less than five percent of oil wastes in the U.S.
were dumped into dirt pits in 1985, according to a survey by industry trade group
American Petroleum Institute. 26 Most drilling muds were shipped to special offsite disposal centers and while most U.S. states with petroleum activity banned the
discharge of oil wastes into freshwater streams m the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S.
federal government banned such dumping nationwide m 1979 with only very
limited exceptions.27 Alternatively, oil companies in the U.S. and many other
countries were reinjecting waste into the ground. 2i
According to the interviews and documents produced during discovery in the
U.S. case, "Texaco dumped waste water directly into streams and the jungle
instead of using disposal methods safer for the environment and public health that
became common in the United States dunng the 1970s and 1980s. Oil company
officials regarded those methods as too expensive to be cost-effective in
Ecuador.,29 A 1976 Texaco memorandum indicated that "the Ecuadorian
government wanted the pits drained and covered because they collapsed in heavy
rams and released contaminated water" but warned that such action would be
"considerably more costly ,,30 Although the Ecuadorian pits were never drained,
Texaco officials maintain the pits were promptly repaired.3' Michael Econmides,
coauthor of The Color of Oil, stated, "That's an obviously bad practice. They
would never have done that in the United States.",32 Judith Kimerling, an
environmental law professor and author of Release of Amazon Crude, which first
exposed the impact of Texaco's oil developments in 1991, said, "The big picture is
that we know from experience around the world that it's irresponsible to just dig a
hole, dump your waste and walk away. That's exactly what Texaco did m
Ecuador.,33 The plaintiffs suit alleges "[tihe waste, a chemical stew of heavy
metals such as arsenic and carcinogens such as benzene, increased levels of cancer,
infant mortality, spontaneous abortions, headaches, stomach ailments and skm
diseases 4 [and that]
the effects of pollution also harmed crops and
3
livestock.

Petroleum Company, to K. Bandell, ramforest activist (Aug. 5, 1993) (on file with the Harv. Hum. Rts.
25. Miller, supra note 12.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Lifsher, supra note 6.
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Health and Cultural Impacts
Nearly 2.5 million acres of pristme rain forest were opened up to land
speculation, colonization, deforestation, ranching, logging and agn-mdustry as a
result of Texaco's access roads forcing the indigenous Tetetes off their land and
dispossessing the indigenous Cofan of their traditional temtory '5 In addition to
being displaced, the deforestation and pollution have severely degraded the
indigenous peoples' hunting and fishing territories leading to malnutrition and
pushing them to the brink of extinction.36 Furthermore, exposure to outside
influences has destabilized indigenous communities and exposed them to
epidemics of foreign diseases, prostitution and alcoholism.37
In an Affidavit of the Secoya Tribe, Elias Piaguate, offers the following
testimony*
We are a traditional people of fishermen and hunters who for centunes have
depended on the river and land in order to survive.
The effects of what Texaco has done have been disastrous for us. Because of the
contamination caused by Texaco in the river, we can no longer fish; use water
from the river to cook or drink; wash our clothes in the river; or bathe peacefully
in the nver
Before Texaco came, a hunter spent three hours finding food for
this whole family. Now, with the low number of animals, a hunter can go out for
the whole day and not find even a little animal. We do not have enough food and
we are undernourished.
Our health has been damaged seriously by the contamination caused by Texaco.
Many people in our community now have red stains on their skin and others have
been vomiting and fainting. Some little children have
died because their parents
38
did not know they should not dnnk the river water.
In April of 1993, a Harvard public health study found that oil-related

contaminants in the drinking, bathing and fishing water samples contained
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) ten to one-thousand times greater than
USEPA's safety guidelines. 39 The study concluded that "[tihe presence of high
levels of toxic compounds and oil-related injuries indicate that the exposed

35. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 206. Displacement is widely believed to have hastened their
extinction as a people. Id. at n.32 (citing Interview with Luis Carrera, President of the Environmental
Advisory Commission to the President of the Republic, in Quto, Ecuador (Jan. 26, 1994)).
36. Id. at 206-07. Other adverse impacts include the destruction of crops, forest resources, and
habitat, erosion, sedimentation of surface waters, and soil degradation. Id at n.30.
37. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 207
38. Affidavit of the Secoya Tribe Given by Elias Piaguaie, Agurnda IX., (No. #93-CV-7527). See
Amazon Watch, Ecuador: The Chevron-Texaco Toxic Legacy: The Legal Case Against Chevron Texaco,
at http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/toxico/index.php?page_number-4 (last visited April 4,
2004). Indigenous tribes of Huaorani, Quichua, and Secoya were also forced off their territorial lands
by Texaco's expanding infrastructure. Kimerling, supra note 8, at n.33.
39. CESR, supra note I at Executive Summary.
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population faces an increased risk of serious and non-reversible health effects such
as cancers and neurological and reproductive problems. °
A study published m 2002 by Miguel San Sebastian, a Spanish
epidemiologist, found that people living in countries with oil drilling faced
significantly higher risks of cancer, especially stomach, rectum and kidney cancer
for men, and cervix and lymph node cancer for women. 41 The report was produced
after San Sebastian examined 985 cases of cancer in the Amazon reported to a
central health registry between 1985 and 1998.42 According to San Sebastian,
studies show is that something is happening there. But it's tough to
"What the
make the direct link that the oil is causing these cancers., 43 San Sebastian's study
was criticized by Jack Siemiatycki, a University of Montreal professor of
epidemiology and authority on environmental causes of cancer, who said "[t]here's
no more than a hint of link" between cancer and oil exposure. 44 San Sebastian's
1999 Yana Curt Report acknowledged that his study of San Carlos where Texaco
built more than thirty wells was not enough to prove the devastating health effect
of Texaco's operations throughout the region, but did find that males were at risk
for cancer of the larynx, bile ducts, liver, stomach, melanoma and leukemia
associated with a high risk of mortality from such diseases. 45 A health study
published by the Ecuadorian Union of Popular Health Promoters of the Amazon
(UPPSAE) found that individuals exposed to oil had higher occurrences of
abortion, elevated rates of fungal infection, dermatitis, headache, and nausea.46
While the science as to the cause of the devastating health crises in the Oriente is
disputed, it is clear that both the health and cultures of the indigenous peoples have
been damaged by ChevronTexaco's oil operations there.
Texaco's Economic and Political Sway on The Republic of Ecuador
Texaco used its immense economic resources and political ties to maintain
their operations with little to no government oversight or regulation. According to
T. Christian Miller, a writer for the Los Angeles Times that reviewed discovery
materials and conducted interviews of litigants, discovery documents reveal that
the U.S. Embassy
"Texaco executives dined with presidents and ministers,
Texaco handed
gave Texaco access to top officials during trade missions, [and]
out contracts to current and former Ecuadonan military officials. One memo notes
47
the benefits of continuing a contract with a former Ecuadorian navy officer.,
40. Id.
41. Miller, supranote 12.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Dr. Miguel San Sebastan, Yana Curt Report Summary, Sept. 1999, available at
http://www.texacorainforest. com/case/index.htm (last visited April 4, 2004) (Two medial doctors in
collaboration with the Department of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene of the University of London
conducted the public health study of the inhabitants of San Carlos.).
46. CESR, supra note 1, at 9 (The study examined 1,465 people in ten communities with 1,077
residing in oil-containuated areas and 388 m non-contarminated areas.).
47 Miller, supra note 12.
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Texaco used its economic superiority to manipulate its often strained relations with
the Ecuadorian government. "On a few occasions, when the disputes got especially
nasty, the company
withheld payments to the government for the oil it was
48
shipping out."
Conversely, Texaco also issued multimillion-dollar loans with generous terms
to the economically-challenged Ecuadorian government.
When Ecuador's
president made an urgent plea following a devastating earthquake m 1987 Texaco
agreed to supply an interest-free $33 million loan.49 Officials noted that it would
help the company acquire a contract extension. 50 Economic forces weighed
heavily in Texaco's favor as a means of manipulating environmental regulation of
its operations, and m turn, the Republic of Ecuador used the pretext of an improved
economy to justify exploiting its own people and their habitats.
The Ecuadorian government's regular budget cuts for environmental
programs are representative of their lack of concern for the environmental impact
of Texaco's drilling operations. Government-owned PetroEcuador, a partner in the
consortium, played a supporting role in the devastation of the Amazonian Oriente
region. Texaco manager, Rene Bucaram, said, "the state oil company erased the
budget line for environmental operations to save money" and Texaco "would
follow suit by suspending its 37.5% share of the funding required m the
consortium deal.'
Memorandums produced through discovery showed that m
some years Texaco's budget was zero for environmental tasks.52 "Nine out of
twelve months, [the government] cut the costs for environmental work," and
Texaco had no qualms with cutting its budget in response.5 ZPetroEcuador's
president and former Texaco worker said Texaco "should have followed the same
standards they were following in the United States, but the authorities here were
not demanding it. Texaco did what the authorities asked, the mmmium required.
Back then, nobody talked about the environment." 54 Ecuadonan government
officials said they were unaware of the environmental damage taking place at the
time. They said Texaco "assured them that it was using the best technology
available." 55 Retired Gen. Rene Vargas, who headed Ecuador's Energy Mimstry
m the early 1970s, claimed, "If they had done m the U.S. what they did here, they
would have been made prisoners. They knew it was a crime. 56 The responsible
parties have been pointing fingers at one another for over a decade, meanwhile the
indigenous peoples whose health, cultures and habitats were all-but destroyed by
the consortium's activities m the Oriente have received no reparations.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. ("Texaco's public relations image is in need of improvement, which will be attended to
immediately, said one memo written by a Texaco executive after the quake).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id (Texaco Manager Bucaram said, "I wouldn't say Texaco was sorry to see this happen. I'd
be a liar.").
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id. ("Call us ignorant, call us ingenious, I accept it. We just didn't know, said Vargas).
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Texaco's Departure from Ecuador
PetroEcuador acquired complete ownership of the Consortium in 1992 when
TexPet relinquished its interests in the operation. 5' Upon termination of the
concession, Texaco conducted two audits to assess the unpact of the consortium's
operations on soil, water and air, and assess compliance with environmental laws,
regulations and generally accepted operating practices.58 A summary of one of
these audits reported that during the consortium's two decades of operations,
"some activities were potentially noncompliant with Ecuadorian law" and samples
from five rivers determined that the discharge of produced water had altered their
chemistry to be higher in salt, oil and particulate waste. 59 The summary further
noted contamination at 25% of the well sites visited, but characterized the damage
as limited. 60 Despite these findings, Texaco asserts that the audits conclude there
was no lasting or significant environmental impact from the consortium's
operations. 6 1 A close review of the audits' criteria and basic assumptions reveals
that the absence of specific quantitative standards by which to measure Texaco's
compliance, Texaco could conduct its operations "in accordance with any level of
compliance [it] felt appropriate or necessary." 62 Additionally the critena's adopts
a compliance standard defined by oil industry practices in tropical regions (remote
Third World countries) rather
than compliance standards based on environmental
63
and public health inpacts.
In March 1995, after two lawsuits were filed in a U.S. federal court against
Texaco for pollution caused in the Oriente and Peruvian lands downstream, Texaco
negotiated an Agreement for Environmental Reparations with the Ecuadonan
government which resulted in a $40 million dollar cleanup in exchange for a Final
Release of Claims and Delivery of Equipment and negotiated a settlement with
Municipalities in the drilling region that released Texaco from any future
obligations or liabilities. 64 While ChevronTexaco contends that its $40-million
cleanup in response to the audits was designed to ensure that there was no lasting
environmental damage, Steven Donziger, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, said, "It's like
treating skin cancer with makeup. They never dealt with the underlying
problems. 65 Plaintiffs' claims that the cleanup effort was deficient are supported
by a local environmental group associated with the plaintiffs whose survey of the
waste pits cleaned by Texaco "found that nearly all continued to have oil residue or

57. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
58. ChevronTexaco, Environmental Remediation, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/

en/overview/#a4 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
59. Miller, supra note 12.

60. Id.
61. ChevronTexaco, supra note 58.
62. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 217 (citing HBT Agra Limited, Final Assessment Criteria for an
Environmental Evaluation of the Petroecuador Consortium Oil Fields, 27-28 (Oct. 1992)).
63. Kimerling, supra note 8, at 217.
64. ChevronTexaco, Environmental Remediation, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador (last
visited Mar. 15, 2004).

65. Miller, supra note 12.
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other contamination." 66 Remediation by Texaco prior to its departure from
Ecuador, although strongly criticized by plaintiffs as inadequate, is heavily relied
upon by Texaco67as excusing it from over twenty years of social and environmental
irresponsibility

After a merger in 2001, Texaco became ChevronTexaco, the second largest
energy company in the world.68 The newly formed company did not deny
dumping production wastes into the Amazonian environment, but claimed their
waste disposal techniques at the tune were consistent with oil industry practices in
other tropical countries such as Angola, Brazil, Columbia, Indonesia, Mexico, and
Nigeria. 69
In other words, they employed disposal practices used i
underdeveloped nations that had little to no environmental regulatory standards
rather than the more stringent health-based standards imposed by the U.S.
ChevronTexaco dismissed the health claims in the Oriente as unsupported by any
credible, substantiated scientific evidence." 70
Moreover, the company denied responsibility for any environmental damage
based on their position as a minority partner and their claim that operations were
controlled by the state-owned oil company PetroEcuador and TexPet (Texaco's
Ecuador subsidiary), as well as approved by the Ecuadonan government. 7'
Although ChevronTexaco maintains that its only involvement in Ecuadorian oil
development was through indirect investment in its subsidiary, TexPet, the
affidavits of plaintiffs' witnesses indicate that "the most important contract for
field operations were approved and signed in the United States" and company
policy demanded that authorization be sought regarding annual budgets and
expenditures. 72 Despite ChevronTexaco's claim of only indirect involvement in
Ecuador, lax environmental regulatory structures and a complicit Republic of
Ecuador desperate for direct foreign investment created oil operation that gave rise
to substantial liabilities.
PotentialLiabilitiesfor Reparations in the Oriente
Plaintiffs against Texaco sought money damages and extensive equitable
relief to redress contamination of the water supplies and environment including:
financing for environmental cleanup to create access to potable water and hunting

66. Id.
67 ChevronTexaco, supra note 64.
Watch,
Ecuador:
68. Amazon
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/

The

Chevron-Texaco

Toxic

Legacy,

at

toxico/index.php?pagenumber=5 (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). On Oct. 9, 2001, Chevron and Texaco

completed the merger that formed ChevronTexaco. ChevronTexaco, Chronology of Events: Texaco
and Ecuador ChronologicalOverview, at http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador (last visited Apr. 10,
2004).
http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/
69. ChevronTexaco, Response to Claims, at
en/response to clanis/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2004) [hereinafter ChevronTexaco Response to Claims].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at Silva Af. 2-3.
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and fishing grounds; renovating or closing the Trans-Ecuadonan Pipeline; creation
of an environmental monitoring fund; establishing standards to govern future
Texaco oil development; creation of a medical monitoring fund; and injunction
restraining Texaco from entering into activities that risk environmental or human
injuries, and restitution. 7 3 Dave Russell, an Atlanta-based toxics specialist and
U.S. expert consultant to the plaintiffs estimated that "[c]leanmg up toxic wastes in
the Ecuadorian Amazon region could cost ChevronTexaco Corp. more than $5
billion and take as long as ten years." 74 According to Russell, "The damage is to
and the only way to effectively curtail pollution would be
the entire ecosystem
soil. Such a
and
mcmerate millions of tons of contaminated
to dig up, transport
75
undertaken.,
ever
effort
decontamination
any
dwarf
would
project
U.S. CASES: AGIENDO & JOTA V TEXACO
A putative class action suit against Texaco, Inc., Aguinda v. Texaco (Agumnda
1), was filed in November of 1993 in federal court m New York by a team of U.S.
lawyers headed by Ecuadonan-Amencan Cnstbal Bonifaz, and Joseph C. Kohn, a
Philadelphia lawyer, on behalf of plaintiffs compnsed of mestizo settlers, members
of the Cofan, Siona, and Secoya indigenous communities or the Sucumbios and
Orellana provinces, in the north of the Oriente. 76 New York was chosen by
plaintiffs as the home of Texaco's international headquarters where many of the
decisions regarding oil operations in Ecuador were made. 77 The suit alleges abuses
by Texaco that include large-scale disposal of inadequately treated hazardous
wastes and destruction of tropical ram forest habitats in the Amazon basin resulting
in harm to indigenous peoples living in the rain forest and to their property, and to
the stability of Amazon basin habitats. 78 Lead attorney Bonifaz, formerly a
chemical engineer, described the environmental destruction as an "apocalyptic
environmental nightmare unlike any the ramforest has ever seen."79
Fearing the suit against Texaco would deter future international investment in
Ecuador's oil development, the Ecuadorian government initially opposed the suit.
In December 1993, Texaco moved for dismissal on grounds of failure to join the
Republic of Ecuador, international comity, and forum non convemens.80 Texaco
also submitted a letter addressed to the U.S. Department of State from Ecuador's
ambassador to the U.S. stating that Ecuador regarded the suit as "an affront to
73. Jota v. Texaco Inc. (Agunda IV), 157 F.3d 153, 156, n.2 (2nd Cir. 1998).
74. Lifsher, supra note 6.
75. Id ("To put this in perspective, you're looking at something, sizewise, larger than the
Chemobyl disaster, said Russell.).
76. Complaint, Agumda v. Texaco, Inc.(Aquinda ), Dkt. No. 93 Civ. 7527 (S.D.N.Y filed Nov.
3, 1993); The Advocacy Project, The Fightfor the Amazon: In the New York Courts, 16 AMAZON OIL
5, Mar. 11, 2001, at http://www.advocacynet.org/news-view/news_192.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
See also Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473.
77. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 473 (noting plaintiffs' allegations that Texaco's Ecuador activities
through its operations in the United States.").
were "designed, controlled, conceived, and directed
78. Agumdal, 1994 WL 142006 at 1.
79. The Fightfor the Amazon: In the New York Courts, supra note 76.
80. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at 474.
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Ecuador's national sovereignty "81 Despite Texaco's assertions that Ecuador's
courts would be a more convenient forum for litigation, Judge Broderick issued a
groundbreakmg decision upholding the plaintiffs' clain that Texaco's dumping m
Ecuador could be in violation of international law and reserved decision on
Texaco's motion to dismissing stating:
[t]he extent to which any actionable conduct falls into these categories
cannot be determined absent discovery to permit definition of the actual
events, if any, which are violative of law enforceable by the courts of the
United States, and what relief, if any, would be appropriate. It is thus
unclear at this point whether or not any indispensable parties are currently
omitted from the complaint. 8 2
In December of 1994, lawyers representing Peruvian individuals, Jota, and
indigenous communities filed a companion class action suit based on the same
grievances and alleging the pollution spread downstream to Peru.8 3 Jota plaintiffs
alleged they would suffer personal injuries and property damage as a result of
"negligent or otherwise improper oil piping and waste disposal practices" and
based their claims on "theories of negligence, public and private nuisance, strict
liability, medical monitoring, trespass, civil conspiracy, and the Alien Tort Claims
Act (ATCA)." 4
The death of Judge Broderick in February 1995 changed the course of the
Aguinda I suit, which was then assigned to Judge Barrington Parker for completion
of discovery and was again transferred to District Judge Jed
Rakoff, who found the
85
previous courts afforded the plaintiffs "unusual leeway."
U.S. DistrictCourt andSecond Circuit Court ofAppeals Play Hot Potato
First U.S. District Court Decision
In November 1996 following discovery, Judge Rakoff granted Texaco's
motion and dismissed the Aguinda complaint on grounds of international comity,
forum non conveniens, and failure to join indispensable parties proclaiming
Ecuador's courts would be a more convenient forum for the litigation.8 6 In
response to the court's declaration that the Sovereign Immunities Act barred the
court's assertion of jurisdiction over either Ecuadorian entity, the government of
81. Id.
82. Aguinda 1, 1994 WL 142006 at 7, 10.
83. Ashanga v. Texaco, Inc. (Jota) Dkt. No. 94 Civ. 9266 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 28, 1994)(onginal
complaint was labeled Ashanga, but is since known as Jota). See alsoAguinda IX., 303 F.3d at 474.
84. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda VIII), 142 F Supp. 2d 534, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Aguinda
IX., 303 F.3d at 473.
85. Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda 11), 945 F Supp. 625,627 (S.D.N.Y 1996).
86. Aguinda II, 945 F Supp. at 628 (The court noted that the plaintiffs' failure to join
PetroEcuador and the Republic of Ecuador as parties would make granting equitable relief
"unenforceable on its face, prejudicial to both present and absent parties, and an open invitation to an
international political debacle.").
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Ecuador filed a motion to intervene and plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion to
reconsider the court's dismissal.8 7 The Republic of Ecuador's affidavit stated that
it was motivated to "protect the interests of the indigenous citizens of the
Ecuadorian Amazon who were seriously affected by the environmental
contamination attributed to the defendant company" and agreed to "procure the
necessary mdeninization in order to alleviate the environmental damage caused by
Texaco."88 The Ecuadonan government did not, however, waive sovereign
immunity with regard to claims asserted by the Jota plaintiffs or counterclaims
made by Texaco. 89 Both motions were denied m the decision to dismiss. 9° After
the second complaint (Jota) was dismissed in 1997 the citizens of Ecuador and
Peru appealed. 9'
First U.S. Appeal
In October 1998, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded
Judge Rakoff's decision instructing the District Court to independently re-weigh
the relevant factors for a forum non convemens dismissal and review international
comity "in light of all the then current circumstances, including Ecuador's position
with regard to the maintenance of this litigation m the United States forum." 92 The
Court of Appeals articulated an intent to ensure that Texaco would submit to
jurisdiction in Ecuador. 93
Following the Court of Appeal's decision, the citizens of Ecuador and Peru
moved for recusal of Judge Rakoff on grounds that the judge's attendance at an
expense-paid seminar sponsored by organizations that received funding from
Texaco after his initial dismissal of the case raised the appearance of impropnety. 94
After Judge Rakoff denied the motion, Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus and
Court of Appeals Circuit Judge Winter denied the petition finding that Judge
Rakoff did not abuse his discretion m denying petitioner's motion and that
attendance at the expense-paid environmental law seminar, given Texaco's
"indirect and minor funding role and the lack of a showing that any aspect of the
semmar touched upon an issue material to the disposition of a claim or defense in
[a] reasonable person would not doubt the judge's
the current litigation,
87. Aguinda IV 157 F.3d at 158. See Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(b), 1604
(stating foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States and of
the States).
88. AgumdalV 157 F.3d at 157-58.
89. Id. at 158.
175 F.R.D. 50, 50-53 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (denying
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda 111),
90. Id.,
motions for intervention and reconsideration).
91. AguindalV 157 F.3dat 158.
92. Aguinda IV 157 F.3d at 159, 161. See also Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda V), 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (reopening the record to consider additional submissions regarding
whether the courts of Ecuador and/or Peru might reasonably be expected to exercise a modicum of
independence and impartiality).
93. AgumndalV 157 F.3d at 159.
94. See Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Aguinda VI), 139 F Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See also
Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Aguinda), 241 F.3d 194, 197, 206-7 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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95
impartiality m this case" and therefore, disqualification was not required.

U.S. District Court Decision on Remand
In the District Court case on remand, Ecuador's ambassador to the U.S.
informed the Court that the Republic of Ecuador was "not willing under any
circumstance, to waive its sovereign immunity and be subject to rulings by Courts
of the United States." 96 Thereafter, Texaco renewed its motion to dismiss after
consenting to personal jurisdiction in Peru and Ecuador and stipulating that it
would waive statute of limitation defenses for the appeal period to allow plaintiffs
to file in Ecuador, and plaintiff's use of discovery acquired in the U.S. courts in
future suits. 97 In a forty-six page decision issued May 30, 2001, Judge Rakoff
again granted Texaco's motion to dismiss concluding that Texaco satisfied the
burden of demonstrating an adequate alternative forum, the private and public
interest factors weighed heavily in favor of Texaco, and rejected the plamtiff's
assertions that public interest factors should be analyzed under the ATCA Law of
Nations test.98 The court also addressed concerns expressed by plaintiffs that
Ecuador's Interpretive Law 55 stipulates that its courts cannot weigh a case once it
has been filed abroad by reassuring Plaintiffs that it would be willing to reconsider
if the Ecuadorian court dismissed the suit on the basis of Ecuadonan Law 55/98. 99
After considering arguments about whether the Ecuadorian court could be
impartial after a military coup that deposed President Jamil Mahuad, 1°° Judge
Rakoff said the courts of Ecuador can exercise "that modicum of independence and
impartiality necessary to an adequate alternative forum" and that "[t]he record
establishes overwhelmmgly that these cases have everything to do with Ecuador
and nothing to do with the United States. ' ' i The case was once again appealed to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Final U.S. Appeal
Attorneys for the Ecuadorian plaintiffs disagree that Ecuadorian courts
exercise the necessary independence from military involvement in civil affairs.
Citing corruption and bureaucratic obstruction in the Ecuadorian court system,
95. Agumda VI1,139 F Supp. 2d at 439- Agumda v. Texaco, Inc. (Agunda VII), 241 F.3d at 194,
198, 206-7 (2nd Cir. 2001).
96. Agunda IX, 303 F.3d at 475; See also Aguinda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 537 (District Court
decision of Judge Rakoff).
97. Agumda IX, 303 F.3d at475.
98. Agumda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 534, 537, 548, 553.
99. Id. at 546-47 (Law 55/98 was new Ecuadonan statute that attempted to preclude lawsuits

initiated ina foreign forum.).
100. President Jamil Mahuad was replaced by elected vice-president, Gustavor Noboa. U.S.
Department of State, Ecuador- Country Reports on Human Rights Practices- 2001, Mar. 4, 2002,
availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/200l/wha/8356.htm.
101. Agumda VII1,142 F Supp. 2d at 538, 543-44, 545-46; Reuters, Judge Dismisses Indians Suits
Against
Texaco,
June
1,
2001,
available
at
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm?newsid=l 1029 (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
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plaintiffs' attorneys claim overwhelming impediments.10 2 The 1999 State Report
for Ecuador concluded that Ecuador's legal system was "inefficient and
corrupt."1 0 3 Furthermore, plaintiffs' appellate brief urged that a ruling concerning
itself only with the functionality of a foreign court as an adequate alternative forum
allows U.S. corporations to violate the Law of Nations with impunity. 14 Some of
the obstacles cited were the inadequacies of the Ecuadonan court, the inability to
compel witness testimony, prohibition of class actions, and exorbitant court filing
fees. 05 Additionally, plaintiffs point out that the largest fines for failure to comply
with a court order are between $90 and $180 U.S. dollars. 16
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered many of the
obstacles cited by the plaintiffs, but ultimately affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of the Ecuadorian and Peruvian plaintiffs' suit for forum non conveniens
with an extension of tune to file their actions in Ecuador. 10 7 The decision was
premised on the theory of forum non convenens.'1 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit articulated the test for forum non convemens to be first,
ascertaining the degree of deference due to plaintiffs' choice of forum followed by
a determination as to whether an adequate alternative forum exits. t 9 If so, the
court must "then balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the
parties m maintaining the litigation m the competing fora and any public interests
at stake" to determine whether the defendant can meet the burden of proof
requisite to overcoming the plaintiff s choice of forum." 0
In considering whether Ecuador was an adequate alternative forum, the Court
found no abuse in discretion by the District Court in its findings that Law 55/98
would not preclude a suit in Ecuador after having first been initiated in the U.S. as
the Law had been declared unconstitutional by the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court
on April 30, 2002."' The Court further found no merit to plaintiff's claims that
Ecuadonan courts were unreceptive to tort clais and with regard to the absence
of class action mechanisms stating "[w]hile the need for thousands of individual
plaintiffs to authorize the action m their names is more burdensome than having
them represented by a representative in a class action, it is not so burdensome as to
deprive the plaintiffs of an effective alternative forum."' " 2 As to the arguments of
Ecuadorian courts' corrupt influence and ability to be impartial, the court cited the
102. Brieffor Plaintiffs-Appellants, Agumda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 ( 2nd Cir. 2002) (Nos.
01-7756(L), 01-7758(Con)) at13-14.
103. Id.at 12-13.
104. Id.at 52.
105. Id at 11-12, 28.
106. Id at28-29.
107. Aguinda IX, 303 F.3d at 477-80.
108. Id.at 480. Forum non convemens is "[tihe doctnne that an appropnate forum - even though
competent under the law - may divest itself of jurisdiction if for the convenience of the litigants and
witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another forum in which the action might
originally have been brought. Blacks Law Dictionary, 290-91 (2nd pocket ed. 2001).
109. Id. at476.
110. Id.
111.Id. at 477.
112. ld.at477-78.
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District Court's finding and noted that "because these cases will be the subject of
close public and political scrutiny, as confirmed by the Republic's involvement in
the litigation, there is little chance of undue influence being applied."' 13 The
Court, however, did agree with the plaintiffs' objection to the District Court's
allowance of only sixty days to file claims in Ecuador stating that "[iln Ecuador,
because class action procedures are not recognized, signed authorizations would
need to be obtained for each individual plaintiff. This presents a formidable
administrative task for which we believe sixty days is inadequate time."' 114 Thus,
the Court directed the District Court to modify its ruling to make dismissal
"conditioned on Texaco's agreeing to waive any defense based on a statute of
limitations for limitation periods expirmng between the date of filing these United
States actions and one year (rather than sixty days) following the dismissal of these
actions."' 15

The court also found no abuse of discretion in the District Court's conclusion
that private interests "weigh heavily" in favor of an Ecuadonan forum. i16 The
Court stated:
The relative ease of access to sources of proof favors proceeding in Ecuador. All
plaintiffs, as well as members of their putative classes, live in Ecuador or Peru.
Plaintiffs sustained their injuries in Ecuador and Peru, and their relevant medical
and property records are located there. Also located in Ecuador are the records of
decisions taken by the Consortium, along with evidence of Texaco's defenses
implicating the roles of PetroEcuador and the Republic. By contrast, plaintiffs
have failed to establish that the parent Texaco made decisions regarding oil
operations
in Ecuador or that evidence of any such decisions is located in the
1 17
U.S.

Furthermore, the court noted that it would be onerous for a New York court to
handle translation issues and that "to the extent that evidence exists within the
U.S., plaintiffs' concerns are partially addressed by Texaco's stipulation to allow
use of the discovery already obtamed. ''iS Likewise, the Court found that the
district court was within its discretion in concluding that the public interest factors
tilt in favor of dismissal." 9 The Court did not address the two additional practical
considerations raised by plaintiffs regarding financial burden of filing fees in
Ecuador and travel advisories issued for the province in which the Ecuadorian trial
would be held stating that, "[i]t is sufficient answer that these contentions need not
be recognized when raised for the first time on appeal."' 120 The Court also passed
on the plaintiffs' plea to interpret the ATCA "to encompass their environmental
claim" and "to express
a strong U.S. policy interest in providing a forum for
113. Id. at 478 (citing Aguinda VIII, 142 F Supp. 2d at 544-46).
114. Id.
at 478.
115. Id. at 478-79.
116. Id. at479.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 480.
120. Id.at 479.
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the adjudication of such clams" 121 The Court, therefore, affirmed the District
Court's dismissal subject to modification. Thus, the theory of forum non
convemens served as a mechanism to protect multinationals from liability in the
U.S. where the wrongs committed by the multinational's subsidiaries were
committed in a foreign jurisdiction.
ECUADOR CASE: REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR AND PETROECUADOR V
TEXACO
EcuadorianTrial ProceedingsBegin
The case filed in Ecuador following the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmation of the District Court's dismissal on grounds of forum non convemens,
represented the first time Texaco or any other U.S. oil company was forced to face
judgment in an Ecuadorian court.'22 This landmark lawsuit was heard in "a small
courthouse m
Lago Agno, a remote town m the heart of Ecuador's oil
23
operations."'1
The trial's first phase, focusing on testimony and evidence, ended on October
27 2003 after testimony, including that of former minister of Ecuador's Ministry
of Mines and Energy who testified that a Texaco subsidiary "knowingly used
primitive waste disposal techniques m the 1970s and 1980s."' 124 Questioning of
witnesses, including experts, m an Ecuadorian trial is done by the judge working
from questions proposed by the parties' lawyers; there are no crossexaminations.' 25 Judge Albert Guerra Bastidas questioned witnesses including
Rene Vargas Pasos, the former energy minister who dealt with Texaco's Ecuador
subsidiary m the mid-1970s.126 Pasos told the judge "Texaco designed and
managed the oil fields that fouled the region with vast quantities of oily waste..
Texaco knew
its waste pits were not well-constructed, that they were" polluting
the rain forest. i27 "1believe they were committing a crime against the region and
the country, he added. "The consequences have demonstrated this: hundreds of
people dead and sick. The
water from the rvers is not good for drinking, not for
' 28
bathing. It is a disaster."'

121. Id at 480 ("Even if we were to accept plaintiffs' view of the law on both questions, the pnvate
and public interest factors that affect this case would nonetheless require that we affirm the district
court's judgment").
122. Amazon Watch, Media Advisory, HistoricTrialAgainst ChevronTexaco Begins Tomorrow In
Ecuador- Protests At Company's Headquarters in California, Oct. 20, 2003, at
http://www.texacorainforest.org/histonctnal.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
123. Id.
124. Tom Knudson, Testimony Ends m Oil Giant's Ecuador Trial, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 30,
2003, http://www.texacoratnforest.org/oct302003.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
125. Lifsher, supranote 6.
126. Knudson, supra note 124.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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ChevronTexaco presented no witnesses during the first phase. 12 9 However,
"thousands of pages of previously confidential memos, studies and internal
documents that reveal the inner workings of Texaco and its majority partner, the
Ecuadorian state oil company, Petroecuador," were released. 3 An internal Texaco
letter included in the thousands of pages of documents submitted into evidence by
Plaintiffs' attorneys indicated the "oil company rejected the option of lining its
earthen waste pits to protect the environment as too expensive."i 3 A letter written
in 1980 by a Texaco manager stated, "The current [unlined) pits are necessary for
efficient and economical operation of our drilling
operations. The total cost of
eliminating the old pits and lining new pits would be $4,197,958
It is
recommended that the pits neither be
lined nor filled."' 13 2 Texaco "decided not
to spend the money. And the consequence of not spending money was sacrificing
peoples' lives."13 3 Other documents filed with the court detail spills from the
Trans Ecuadoran Pipeline, which canes oil over the Andes. "From 1972 to 1989,
134
breaks hemorrhaged 297,000 barrels of oil along the pipeline's 300-mile path.'
"These are not just random spills. This is the result of a decision made by Texaco
to install35 a type of drilling process that would lead to a systematic dumping of
toxins" 1

"In a statement released as the trial began last week, Ricardo Rets Veiga, the
company's vice president and general counsel for Latin America, flatly denied any
wrongdoing."' 36 Texaco representatives further maintain that that the use of
unlined pits was both legal in Ecuador at the time and standard practice in regions
with clay soil, such as the Amazon.i17 ChevronTexaco also disputes the claims of
damages to health. According to ChevronTexaco spokesman Chris Gidez, "Over
ten years of litigation have yet to produce any credible and substantiated scientific
information."i' 3s Plaintiffs claim they could not afford large scientific studies, but a
study of cancer and other health problems in one village, an area with thirty oil
wells, found "ten cases of cancer in the village, resulting in a cancer rate of more
than twice the national average."' 139
The study's analysis was labeled
"inadequate
cursory and misleading" by ChevronTexaco's
hired
toxicologist.14 Residents however continue to assert claims such as those of Luis
Yanza, a plaintiff and community organizer who has lived in the region for twentysix years, "ChevronTexaco left the environment full of toxins, the rivers, the land,
129. Lifsher, supra note 6.
130. Miller, supranote 12.
131. Knudson, supra note 124.

132. Id.
133. Id (quoting Cnstobal Bonifaz, lead U.S. Attorney).
134. Id.
135. Brooke A. Masters, Case in Ecuador Viewed As Key Pollution Fight: US. Legal Team Suing
ChevronTexaco, WASHINGTON POST, May 6, 2003, at E01 (quoting Steven Donziger, one of the

plaintiffs' lawyers).
136. Knudson, supranote 124.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Masters, supra note 135.
Id.
Id.
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and a lot of people are suffering. They haven't cleaned up the toxins.'

14 1

Although ChevronTexaco officials further assert that Ecuador's national oil
company set policy for the venture, and that the drilling met all of the country's
environmental requirements, Ecuador's laws were interpreted to allow dumping of
wastes versus the more expensive U.S.-mandated process of re-irjecting the oilcontaminated water back into the well. 42 Yet again the company reverted back to
its unconditional release by the government of Ecuador following the 1998
remediation effort. 143
"ChevronTexaco's effort to shift any remaining
responsibility to the Ecuadorian government doesn't reflect legal and technical
realities at the time Texaco pioneered Amazon oil exploration m the early
1970s.
As the "operating partner, Texaco had a legal obligation to employ
"best practices in respect to the environment'" 4
In the daunting second phase of the trial, the judge will conduct a personal
investigation in the field before bringing the parties back for potential further
questioning. 14' There will be "an inspection of 100 to 150" areas.' 46 In addition to
the site visits to be conducted, Judge Guerra Bastidas has yet to review the over
5,000 pages of documents obtained though discovery in the U.S. 147 "His decision,
which could be appealed to the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, is expected in six to
eight months." 14
Implications of the EcuadorianTrial
The case in Ecuador is being watched closely by environmental and human
rights advocates as well as domestic and multinational corporations because
"[liegal experts say it could be a groundbreakmg case, establishing a new way for
environmental activists to force multinational corporations to pay for what activists
say is environmental devastation. " '4' A 2003 Washington Post article claims:
U.S.-based multinational corporations often try to get cases tried in developing
countries, a tactic that can kill the case entirely because most American plaintiff's
lawyers have neither the money nor the expertise to sue in Third World courts.
Later if the corporations lose, they often argue that the overseas legal process was
flawed or that their U.S. headquarters should not be held responsible for the errors

of a subsidiary in the developing world. 15o

Because foreign courts have previously encountered difficulties

in

making U.S.

Id.
142. Id.
143. Knudson, supra note 124 (quoting Cnstobal Bonifaz, the lead attorney in the U.S. for the
plaintiffs).
144. Lifsher, supra note 6.
145. Id.
146. Knudson, supra note 124 (quoting Judge Guerra Bastidas)..
147. id.
141.

148. Lifsher, supranote 6.
149. Masters, supranote 135.

150. Id.
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multinational companies obey their decisions, the warning by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals that U.S. courts would "step back m if the company tried to
avoid a judgment imposed by the Eucadorean court" may be key to effective
adjudication of wrongs committed by U.S. multinationals m foreign
jurisdictions.' 5 ' According to Chris Jochnick, a New York lawyer who founded
the Center for Economic and Social Rights, oversight by the U.S. courts of a
foreign case "puts pressure on the Ecuadorian court system to perform, that might
be the best resolution. There are thousands of these cases, and there are only so
many the U.S. courts can handle. 152
It is unclear how the Ecuadorian court will rule on the lawsuit m view of
President Lucio Gutierez's bid to attract foreign investment m continuing
Ecuador's oil development. 153 The spokesman for the Ecuadorian embassy said
the Ecuadorian government had not taken a position on the lawsuit, but did say "it
and have suffered
is very clear that the people m the region have health problems 154
for more than ten years. More work is needed to repair the area."'
THE LEGACY CONTINUES ECUADOR'S NEW OIL FRONTIERS
The case is of particular significance today as Ecuador continues to seek
foreign investment in oil development and companies such as Los Angeles-based
Occidental Petroleum and Spanish energy company Repsol YPF are utilizing the
newly opened oil pipeline to drill m untouched sections of the Amazon. 55 "With
U.S. and international oil companies now pushing deeper into Ecuador's virgin
ram forest, a review of the documents, new studies, and interviews with current
and former Texaco executives and Ecuadorian officials provide a portrait of how
the search for oil can wreak havoc on a remote place and its people.', 156 It Is
estimated that 4.5 billion barrels, the equivalent of an eight-month supply of the
U.S. oil demand, remain m the Amazon. 15 7 The new pipeline doubles the capacity
of the Amazon to Pacific Coast terminals, with which Occidental Petroleum
expects to boost production from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels per day from its new
Eden oil field located seventy miles south of Lago Agno. 158 Eden is one of the
most environment-friendly oil facilities in Ecuador with buried power lines and
filtered and cleaned rainwater 59 "It had a high cost, but it's the most responsible
thing to do," said Fernando Granizo, Eden's field manager. 160 Although the
Texaco embroilment has brought greater scrutiny and tighter regulations to drilling

151.

Id.

152. Id.
153. Id., (Gutierrez was supported by indigenous groups in his 2000 coup that eventually led to his
election as President in 2002.).
154. Id.
155. Miller, supranote 12.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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operations m the Amazon, roads, pipelines, and spills are inevitable. "You can
minimize the effect. But there's no human activity that can be done without
impacting the environment. None, said Carlos D'Arlach, Oxy's regional vice
president of community relations. 161 Other environmental and indigenous rights
advocates such as Esperanza Martmes of Ecological Action, an Ecuadorian
environmental group, believe that environmentally sensitive areas and the habitat
of indigenous cultures should be completely off limits as she explains, "It's not
right to sacrifice new areas when this frontier is162m such fragile temtory You can't
say something is right, just because it is legal."'
While the people of the Oriente await reparations for the environmental,
cultural, and medical damage imposed on their territories, the push for oil
continues. The men from the state oil company told Monica Torres, an Oriente
resident, that they wanted to drill another oil well behind her house and gave her
three sheets of tm to cover her roof as compensation.' 63Although free from
Texaco's exploitive practices, the Republic of Ecuador appears to be continuing
Texaco's legacy of maximizing profit to the detriment of the Ecuadorian people's
health and habitat.
ANALYSIS OF ECUADOR'S LEGAL FRAMEWORK. PAST AND PRESENT
EnvironmentalProtection The Role of the Republic of Ecuador
From the inception of oil extraction operation m Ecuador environmental
protection laws, though weak and often unenforced, were m existence. A 1971 law
required oil companies to prevent pollution but contained no specific standards." 4
In accordance, Texaco's contract specifically required it to "prevent contamination
of water, air, and soil. '' 165 In 1976, the Law for the Prevention and Control of
Contamination prohibited the contamination of the environment by pollutants
harmful to human life, health or well-being and declared "the protection of air,
water and soil resources, and the conservation, improvement and reclamation of
the environment
to be in the public mterest" however, implementing
regulations for water pollution were not passed until 1989 with noise and air
regulations implemented m 1990 and 1991 respectively. 166
In 1981 a new law was enacted to establish environmentally protected zones,
which the oil companies, supported by governmental agencies, maintained

161. Id.
162. Id.

163. Id.(Monica Torress added, "They said they were going to take out more crude to help
Ecuador,").
164. The Advocacy Project, The Fightfor the Amazon: Contemptfor the Law, 16,AMAZON OIL 5,
Mar. 11, 2001, http://www.advocacynet.org/newsview/news_192.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Contemptfor the Law].
165. Id.
166. Kimerling, supra note 8, at207-8, n.39.
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permitted the extraction of subsoil minerals. 167 Ecuador's courts decided "that the
companies did indeed have a nght to extract subsoil minerals from protected
areas."' 68 The main environmental protection agency inEcudador was placed
under the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Petroecuador formed an internal
environmental unit, however, it functioned primarily as a public relations
service. 169

In 1977 when Petroecuador acquired a 62.5 percent share of the Texaco
consortium drilling in Ecuador and later took over drilling and pipeline operations
m the early 1990s, it continued to disregard the environment.' 70 Additionally, the
Ecuadorian Congress's committee appointed to supervise the exploitation of
resources in protected areas made no impact on oil extraction operations.
Although stricter regulations were passed in 1992 requiring re-injection of
production water, lining of waste pits, and restricted access to new settlers, these
requirements have not been enforced. 171 "Implementing regulations are
underdeveloped and enforcement mechanisms limited" due to Ecuador's
dependence on the capital and technology of multinational corporations and
"administrative agencies charged with enforcement lack human and financial
resources, political and technical support, and coordination."' 172 When political
support is granted, political instability forces the status quo as evidenced when
former President Jamil Mahuad's decreed protection for ramforests from drilling,
mining and logging was nullified by a coup that deposed him.' 7
Indigenous Peoples Right to Consultation
International laws ratified by Ecuador and the new Ecuadoran Constitution
establish rights for indigenous peoples to have a say in state decisions and projects,
such as oil extraction, effecting their territory and cultural survival. 174 However, a
1994 report from CESR found that citizens of Ecuador have no access to
information regarding oil operations or the associated health risks, and that the
country's constitutional court not provided effective relief for oil contamination
claims.175 Amazoman residents should have been accorded the right to protection
against pollution and consultation on oil exploration within their territories as
derived from international law implemented by Ecuador.
International law protects the right of all people to shelter, livelihood, and a
safe environment. Specifically, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic,
167. Contemptfor the Law, supra note 164. The 1981 law is m reference to the Forestry Law for
Conservation of Natural Areas and Wildlife, R.O., No. 64, Aug. 24, 1981. See generally Kimerling,
supra note 8, at n. 118.
168. Contemptfor the Law, supra note 164.
169. Id.
170. Id
171. Id.
172. Kimerling, supranote 8, at 208.
173. Contemptfor the Law, supra note 164.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 176, 178, 184.
175. CESR, supra note 1,at 27.
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Social, and Cultural Rights, ratified by Ecuador, declares that "[i]n no case may a
people be deprived of its own means of subsistence," and proclaims the "right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health."' 76 In addition, the 1986 U.N. Declaration on the Right to
Development reaffirms the "right of peoples to self-determination, by virtue of
to pursue their economic, social, and cultural
which they have the right
development."' 177 The 1992 Rio Convention on Biological Diversity calls on
signatory governments to introduce procedures requiring an environmental impact
assessment for proposed projects that allow for public participation and requires
parties to protect and encourage customary use of resources in accord with
traditional cultural practices to the conserve or sustain resources.178
After the Ecuadorian government-sponsored preparatory meeting for the Rio
+5 conference in 1997 concluded that "Ecuador lacked legislation to promote
public participation in evaluation of development projects, legislation requiring
such participation was included in Ecuador's new Constitution, which was
implemented m 1998.179 Article 86 of the Constitution promises "to protect the
public's right to live in a healthy environment and to prevent contamination."' 18
Article 84 guarantees the "nontransferable ownerslup of communal lands, which
will be inalienable and indivisible" and "specifically guarantees indigenous
participation in the use and administration of nonrenewable resources and in the
benefits resulting from exploitation of those resources, as well as indemnification
for damages caused by that exploitation."' 1S Article 88 further guarantees
participation in state decisions affecting the environment. 8 2 Article 247 however,
preserves the state's claim over subsoil resources, including oil, and decrees that
these resources will be exploited in the national interest. 183 The Constitution is
reinforced and supplemented by the International Labor Organization'si 1989
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169), which was ratified by
Ecuador in May 1998 and clearly states that the "Government shall: (a) [clonsult
whenever consideration is being given to legislative or
the peoples concerned
administrative measures which may affect them directly "'u Article 7 specifies
176. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (xxi), 21
U.N.GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (1976) (quoted material
can be found at Art. I, Para. 2 and Art. 12, Para. 1 respectively), available at
http://www.unesco.org/education/information/nfsunesco/
pdf/SOCIALE.PDF (last visited Apr. 4,2004).
177 Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR (1986), available at
http://www.unhehr.ch/html/menu3/b/74.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
178. Convention on Biological Diversity (Rio de Janeiro), Dec. 29 1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, Art.
14, Para. I(a), Art. 10(c).
179. The Advocacy Project, The Fight for the Amazon: Ignoring the Right to Consultation, 16
AMAZON OIL 5, Mar. 11, 2001, http://www.advocacynet.org/news-view/news_192.htrnl (last visited
Apr. 4, 2004).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
th
The General Conference of International Labour Organisation, 76 Sess., adoptedJune 27, 1989, at Art.
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that "the peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for
the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions, and
spiritual well-being."' 8 5 Article 15 of ILO 169 specifically identifies the
significance of natural resources declaring that "[tihe rights of the peoples
concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially
safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the
use, management and conservation of these resources" and when "the state retains
ownership of subsoil resources, governments shall consult with" peoples whose
lands are affected to determine to what degree proposed projects will prejudice
86
their interests prior to any undertakings or permitting pertaining to their land.'
International law as adopted by Ecuador as a signatory clearly requires the
participation of indigenous communities where customarily temtonal lands are
concerned.
The new OCP pipeline project that was pushed through without public
participation, however, is an example of the government's disregard for the rights
and protections now afforded indigenous communities. 8 7 Despite Ecuador's
ownership of the subsurface resources, a recent legal finding "suggests that
indigenous people have the right under international law to veto any exploitation
without their consent. ''iSS The Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued a
decision August 31, 2001, ruling that "the government of Nicaragua violated the
rights of the Awas Tingni community when it granted concessions to a private
company to log on the community's 18traditional
lands without consulting with the
9
community or obtaining its consent."'
This is the first binding decision that holds that indigenous peoples have
communal property nghts to land and natural resources based upon traditional
patterns of use and occupation" and that "as a result of customary practices,
possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking
real title
90
to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property.'
Because Ecuador is a state party to the American Convention on Human Rights, on
which this decision was based, the ruling could prove to be a critical legal
precedent for Ecuadonan indigenous communities seeking a voice in decisions to
extract oil within their traditional territories.191 Additionally, the decision required

6.
185. Id.atArt. 7.
186. Id.atArt. 15, Par. I&2.
187 The Advocacy Project, Defending the Amazon, LEGAL ISSUES: The Right to Consultation
and
the
Texaco
Lawsuit,
Feb.
2002,
http://www.advocacynet.org/epage_vew/
amazonoillegal_l 7_63.htmil [hereinafter The Right to Consultation].
188. Id.
189. Inter-Am. C.H.R., The Case of The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua,
Judgment of Aug. 31, 2001, paras. 153b) & 155, available at http://www.utulsa.edu/law/classes/nee/
INTERAMERCT_ HUMAN RTS Mayagna.htrn (last visited Apr. 4, 2004). [hereinafter IACHR];
The Right to Consultation, supranote 187.
190. The Right to Consultation, supranote 187; IACHR, supranote 189, at paras. 149 &151.
191. The Right to Consultation, supra note 187.
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Nicaragua to establish procedures m accord with national and international norms,
which give prompt and specific official recognition and demarcation of the
indigenous community's rights to its communal natural resources and to abstain
from granting or considering any concessions to used natural resources occupied
by the indigenous peoples until land tenure issues were resolved or an agreement
between the parties was reached.1 2
While the requirements set forth in the decision could serve as a framework
for national legislation protecting indigenous temtones, the decision as a whole
serves as an affirmation that indigenous people have a collective right to their
lands, resources, and environment. Although the Ecuadorian government could
now be required, at least on paper, to include the indigenous communities in
decisions regarding whether oil extraction or preservation of the environment and
indigenous culture were in Ecuador's national interest, the indigenous communities
were neither consulted nor allowed to meaningfully participate in the state's
decision regarding oil exploration or extraction between 1971 and 1990 during the
bulk of Texaco's operations in Ecuador. Retroactive application of existing laws
and international standards and decisions to the relevant period of Texaco's
operations would be a boon for plaintiffs m the Ecuadorian trial.
Texaco, however, according to ChevronTexaco's official website on Ecuador,
argues the environmental and labor laws referenced m the lawsuit are not
applicable because according to Ecuadorian Civil Code, clans for damages must
be brought within four years of the alleged activity 193 Moreover, ChevronTexaco
notes that the laws referenced in the suit did not exist at the time of operation and
are not applicable, claiming the Ecuadorian legal system has a "general principle
of non-retroactivity of laws" and therefore, "it is not appropriate to hold operations
responsible for meeting the requirements of a law or regulation that did not exist at
the time of the operations."' 94 Neither Article 15 of Agreement 169, nor the
Constitution of 1998, nor the Environmental Management Act (issued in 1999)
were in effect in Ecuador at the time of the alleged damages.' 95
While the legal battle continues in Ecuador and human rights and
environmental activists as well as multinational operations worldwide await the
landmark decision from the Ecuadorian court, the issue of multinational
accountability and the challenges presented by lack of means of redress against
multinationals remain.
MEANS OF REDRESS AGAINST MULTINATIONALS
The suit brought against Texaco in the U.S. is typical of a relatively new
strategy employed by environmental and human rights activists to get U.S.
corporations into court for abuses committed abroad. Although many U.S. judges
are hesitant to hear disputes arising outside the U.S., the 1789 Alien Tort Claims
192. IACHR, supranote 189, at para. 158(1) & (2).
193. ChevronTexaco Summary, supranote 64.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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Act, which was adopted as a means for the U.S. to prosecute pirates, became the
center of lawsuits brought against multinationals in the U.S. when a court of
appeals ruled m 1980 that the Act allowed foreigners to sue each other m the U.S.
over charges of breaking international laws or legal norms. 19 6 At the time the
Aguinda I suit was brought m 1994, it relied on Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration
stating that states have "the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or
areas beyond the limits of national junsdicton."' 97 Judge Vincent L. Broderick's
landmark decision found it significant that U.S. laws governing hazardous wastes
may have prohibited Texaco's conduct had the alleged conduct been carried out in
the United States.198 He stated that "it is relevant as confirming United States
adherence to international commitments to control such wastes. This tends to
support the appropriateness of permitting suit under 28 USC 1350 if there were
established misuse of hazardous waste of sufficient magnitude to amount to a
violation of international law." 99 Judge Broderick's decision is the first to offer
dicta nearly recognizing a violation of the law of nations for practices inconsistent
with domestic environmental law based on non-treaty international law that "may
be treated as the 'sober second thought of the community' upon which, all law
ultimately rests." 2°° Although a significant legal victory has yet to be claimed
under this strategy a victory for the plaintiffs would create a powerful precedent
and Judge Broderick's dicta leads further down that path than prior court decisions
have dared to venture. 2° '
Plaintiffs suing multinationals generally prefer developed-world courts as the
forum for lawsuits because the courts offer more independence, more plaintiffs'
attorneys are available, and the cases draw more public attention that places
pressure on companies to settle.20 2 Furthermore, the rules regarding discovery and
the relative ease of bringing class-actions suits make U.S. courts particularly
attractive to plaintiffs.20 3 Jurisdictional questions, however, have the potential to
tie cases up for years as evidenced in the Agunda case. "The legal wrangling can
go on for years." 2° On the other side, defendants typically argue for cases to be
heard m the country where the incidents allegedly occurred as did Texaco
spokesman Chris Gidez. "The operations are there [Ecuador]. The evidence is
there. The plaintiffs are there. To think that a U.S. jury could manage this litigation
196. See David R. Baker, US. Firms Face Suitsfor Overseas Acts: New Twist on Anti-pirate Law
Blurs Border, Extends, Liability, SAN FRANcisco CHRONICLE, June 15, 2002, at A-i, available at
http://sfgate.
comlcgi-binlarticle.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/06/15/MN194282.DTL (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
197 Aguindal, 1994 WL 142006 at 6.
198. Idat7
199. Id.
200. Aguinda , 1994 WL 142006 at 6 (citing Chief Justice Harlan F Stone in The Common Law in
the UnitedStates, 50 HARV. L. REV 4, 25 (1936)).
201. Baker, supra note 196.
202. Masters, supranote 135.
203. Id.
204. Id (quoting Malcolm J. Rogge,
Canadian scholar who has written about transnational
environmental cases).
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when everything is going to be in another language and everything is in Ecuador is
preposterous. 2 5 Although U.S. courts appear to provide a means of redress for
foreign plaintiffs against the wrongs committed by multinationals globally, many
bamers exist to successfully pursuing such a lawsuit.
Barriersto Redress Against Multinationals
First and foremost among barriers to suits against multinational corporations
are economic and political mechanisms. According to Alice Palmer of the
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, multinational
corporations "have the greatest capacity to cause harm to people and the
environment on a global scale and to use political, financial and legal leverage to
avoid being brought to account. ' , 206 Palmer claims that "[wiorkers and local
communities seeking to hold multinationals to account for the harm they cause
invariably find that the formidable economic leverage of these corporate giants,
combined with legal and financial obstacles, works to deny them redress. 20 7 The
circumstances cited as the most common reasons for the lack of redress against
multinationals include: 1) national reluctance to enforce regulations that might
threaten foreign investment; and 2) corporate structures that place parent
corporations beyond the reach of domestic
laws; and 3) local communities that
20 8
lack the financial resources to seek redress.
The Structure of Multinational Enterprises and Their Legal Implications
Multinationals are a group of related entities based in various countries such
as a parent entity in the U.S. and subsidiaries in other countries. 209 Additionally,
both the parent and subsidiary may own and operate joint ventures or contract with
one another for various aspects of operations and supply. 21 0 Generally, public
international law governs states, not individuals, and multinationals are afforded
the same legal status of domestic corporations
that of legal persons. 1
Furthermore, because each of the entities based in different countries will be
subject to different legal jurisdictions, multinationals "can exploit jurisdictional
gaps and escape effective regulation. 212 When a wrong in committed by a
multinational in the host country, claims are made against the specific entity whose
operations caused the harm. 2 3 The corporateveil separates each corporate entity
so that the parent is screened from the liability of a subsidiary or a joint-venture

205. Baker, supra note 196.
206. Alice Palmer, Community Redress and Multinational Enterprises, 2, Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), Nov. 2003.
207. Id.at
4.

208. Id.
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partner from liability of the joint venture's operations.21 4 Entities are separated by
separatelegal personalitywhich is a "legal construct that separates each corporate
entity from the other corporate entities within the same corporate 'family tree' ,,215
The corporate veil is pierced only by a demonstration of the requisite amount of
control is exercised by one corporate entity over another, thereby making the
controlling entity liable for the operations of the other.2 16 Thus, the multinationals
are structured in a manner that allows them to exploit gaps in both domestic and
international legal frameworks as separate legal entities afforded status as legal
persons rather than states.
Exploitationof Developing Countriesby Multinationals
Multinationals often seek out developing countries (host countries) with a
large workforce and an abundance of natural resources for foreign direct
investments while maintaining the parent company m a developed country (home
country).21 7 Incentives created by countries seeking to attract foreign direct
investment from multinationals often include regulatory structures "sympathetic to
foreign investment" because the foreign investments generate jobs, economic
activity and development for the host country as was demonstrated in the Republic
of Ecuador's complicity in Texaco's oil extraction operations. 218 Host countries
often have no comprehensive system of corporate regulation or the systems are
ineffective due to lack of resources to enforce existing laws, while multinational
219
structures allow limited recourse and present jurisdictional limitations.
Additionally, the host country's government may favor the economic interests
created by the multinationals investment over enforcement of regulation.
Barriers to Redress m Host Countries v. Barriers m Home Countries
Access to the appropriate administrative body or court by those harmed in the
host country by multinational operations may be limited. Ineligibility to bring a
case is encountered on the basis of standing, which varies by country but typically
requires that only the individuals demonstrating present harm having standing to
bring a complaint. 220 Thus, those who may suffer harm in the future or as is often
the case with environmental harm, those demonstrating only general harm not to a
specific, affected individual may be barred from bringing suit.221 Additionally,
some countries preclude legal proceedings from being brought if legal action was
initiated in another country, such as Law 55/98 in Ecuador. 2

214. Id.
215. Id.
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218. Id.at5.
219. Id. at8-9.
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Another pervasive barrier worldwide is the economic inequity among the
parties. Even though individuals or groups may be eligible to bring suit, they may
lack the resources to pursue lengthy litigation against multinationals who generally
2
"have significant financial and legal resources to defend claims against them."
Finally, multinationals are often structured to ensure that "the entity operating in
the host state has only limited financial assets to compensate or remediate harm"
and jurisdictional limitations preclude reaching the assets of the parent entity in
developed countries where the bulk of the multinationals assets are located. 4
Even if complainants can successfully overcome all the aforementioned barriers
and acquire a judgment in the host-country against the multinational, the judgment
may not be recognized by the multinational's home state as legally enforceable.225
Significant barriers are also encountered by complainants seeking redress in a
multinational's home country The most frequently encountered barriers to redress
for foreigners in the multinational's home countries are issues of choice of forum
or venue, the structure of the multinational or corporate veil, sovereign immunity
of governments for suits involving foreign governmental bodies, extraterritorial
application of domestic laws to foreign activities, and financial resources to bring
suit in home countries. 226 Although in the U.S. the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)
allows U.S. federal courts to hear claims by foreigners for violations of
international laws by a multinationals' operations in foreign countries, "very few
cases advance beyond procedural questions to resolve substantive matters." 227
Procedural barriers were key to Texaco's victory in the Aguinda case, wherein the
theory of forum non convemens precluded the plaintiffs from having the
substantive issues heard by a U.S. court.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO MEANS OF REDRESS AGAINST
MULTINATIONALS
Successfully achieving corporate accountability for multinationals demands
solutions that afford greater access to justice and equity as well as means of
sustamability for societies globally. While intergovernmental agreements and the
development of national regulations promote corporate accountability on a national
or intergovernmental scale, "attempts to develop a legal framework for corporate
accountability at the international level have been fragmented and limited by the
prevailing view of the international community that public international law can
bind countries but not corporations." 228 As recognized by the barriers encountered
in both home and host countries in the Agunda case discussed at length above, "it
would appear that the barriers to redress for multinational wrongs at the national
level cannot be dealt with by individual governments acting alone. 229
223.
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Alternatively, an international approach could serve two primary functions: 1)
facilitate systematic reforms to national means of redress, and 2) create
international means of redress where national systems fail. 23 0 Alice Palmer
proposes the first step requires governments to work together to identify those
means of redress that already exist as well as the gaps or failures m their
implementation followed by governments agreeing on a principal mechanism for
redress.23 1
Based on those principal elements identified, "an international
agreement on national means of redress for multinational wrongs" could be
implemented.232 Such an international agreement would, m addition to providing
financial and technical assistance to national governments for implementation, set
out elements for eligibility or standing, provisions of financial and legal resources
to bring suits, timing and manner of hearings, availability of remedies, and
enforcement of foreign judgments.233
Secondarily, in addition to serving a
backstop to failures in the national procedures, an international framework of
means of redress but would also
require that individuals be granted access to
234
international channels of redress.
The difficulties of implementing such a mechanism lie m gaming
international consensus on the many procedural necessities such as standards,
complaint procedures, enforcement (particularly binding authority of an
international court on national governments), and defining remedies.23 5 Some nonbinding mechanisms are currently under development, such as the United Nations
Sub-Commission Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations,
which could provide the framework for an international structure.236 The most
comprehensive of the binding examples attempts to require national development
of means of redress via agreement is the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to
Information, Public Participation m Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters m force since October 2001 .237The Convention sets out
procedural requirements for access to information and public participation in
environmental matters, and provides a means of redress for breaches of those
requirements or violations of any national environmental law. 23 8 The Convention
also addresses the availability of remedies and assistance mechanisms to remove

230. Id
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 15.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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237. Id at 16; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation m Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), The UN Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE), June 25 1998, available at http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf (last
visited Apr. 4, 2004). The stated objective is to contribute to the protection of the right of every person
to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and wealth being and to ensure this right parties
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Art. I & Art. 3, Para. 1.
238. Id. at Art. 9.
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financial and other bamers.239 Implementation of an international agreement based
on such a model would require universal acceptance to applying international laws
to individuals and multinationals, subjecting them to the jurisdiction of an
international court. While an international mechanism of providing means of
redress is essential to effective regulation of multinational activity in a global
market, this option presents the substantial challenge of gaming international
consensus on universal means of redress where global economies are implicated.
CONCLUSION
Seeking accountability of multinationals in an era of globalization has proven
a daunting task, particularly for indigenous communities lacking adequate means
of redress for wrongs committed m host countries. Although indigenous peoples
were unsuccessful at winning a favorable decision m the U.S. (home country) of
the multinational ChevronTexaco for environmental, cultural, and health damages
incurred in Ecuador and Peru (host countries), the decade of litigation has resulted
i unproved legal structures for indigenous peoples rights.
Ecuador's indigenous movements were galvanized to action which has led to
immense public attention and scrutiny of multinational oil development m Latin
America as well as tougher laws m Ecuador. Ecuador's constitution now affords
indigenous peoples the right to consultation on decisions that affect them.
Additionally, recently implemented environmental laws such as Convention 169 of
the International Labor Organization give indigenous peoples the right to decide
their own model of development. International organizations have also bolstered
indigenous rights recently with the Inter-American Court on Human Rights issuing
a ruling that indigenous peoples have communal property rights to land and natural
resources based upon traditional patterns of use and occupation.
Although progress is being made, substantial work remains within the
international community to ensure that multinationals, while benefiting
economically from global workforces and markets also fulfill their role of social
and cultural responsibility and of improving the economic stability of the markets
within which they operate. Multinationals must be held to universal standards that
ensure social and environmental responsibility and prevent cultural and
environmental devastation such as that inflicted by the ChevronTexaco debacle in
Ecuador. Whether the outcome of the Republic of Ecuador's pending case against
ChevronTexaco is decided in favor of the indigenous peoples or the multinational,
the matter has opened a Pandora's Box of legal, political and economic
implications that must be addressed on an international scale. A responsible world
economy must be attended by umversal standards for multinational accountability,
which demands consensus and collaboration from the international community
239. Id.at Art. 9, Para. 4 requires the availability of "adequate and effective remedies" that are
"fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. (Art. 9, Para. 5 requires States party to the
Convention to consider
"the establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other
barriers to access to justice.").
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acting on grounds of good faith and good neighborliness rather than exploitation of
underdeveloped nations for profit.

